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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 31, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM CASEY

FROM: ANTHONY R. DOLAN *ARD*

SUBJECT: SPECIAL PROJECT

Here is the project we discussed. What do you think?

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY R. DOLAN

SUBJECT: SPECIAL PROJECT

I THE PROBLEM

-- The Miskito Indians are the subject of a genocidal attack by the Marxist regime in Nicaragua.

-- Evidence from the Defense Minister of Germany links the peace movement in Western Europe to heavy financing by the Soviets and the Eastern Bloc nations.

-- Laotian tribesmen, Afghans and Cambodians are subjected to chemical warfare by the Soviets.

-- A famous and accomplished Cuban poet rots in prison in defiance of the Castro regime.

-- Worker strikes in the Baltic States.

-- A brilliant new film by the Canadian Broadcasting Company exposes the KGB's machinations in North America.

-- A Jesuit priest leaves the guerilla movement in Central America, recants his Marxism and reveals the deep involvement of the Cubans and Soviets in the Central American guerilla movement.

-- A defecting Polish general reports that Soviet troops are wearing Polish uniforms and directly participating in the repression of Polish freedom.

-- Copying machines in the Soviet Union are closely guarded by KGB agents and purchases of typewriters require the photography and finger printing of prospective buyers.

The list of incidents above are all items that have appeared in the Western press but have received (with the exception recently of the chemical warfare issue) little attention despite their obvious merit as news stories. The reasons for this are twofold:

First, because of the expansionist nature of its Foreign Policy and its innate understanding of the uses of propaganda, the Soviet Union has largely dictated the terms of the propaganda war between East and West. This has led to the subconscious acceptance by many in the West of Soviet premises in evaluating what is and what is not newsworthy.

Second, the Western press, as survey after survey has shown, is dominated by those who subscribe to the theory that international tensions are largely the result of legitimate misunderstandings -- not deliberate and continuing aggression by the Soviet Empire.

The operative point is that many in the Western media believe, either out of arrogance or naivete, that the Soviets are "just like us" and -- if we could only reach an understanding about our mutual differences -- the arms race and international tensions would diminish or cease.

The Western media is reflecting here the attitude of American foreign policy makers who have argued that in the pursuit of world politics -- as one put it -- "neither the Soviet Union nor the United States have behaved in exemplary fashion."

There is little understanding by those in the media of Soviet ideology and Russian history -- and the impulses to global domination that arise from those phenomena. There is little understanding that the Soviet strategic culture is one totally different from and alien to our own. The United States and Russia are seen as "superpowers" and the important distinctions between them are lost. That is why every cadre of revolutionaries armed and instigated by the Soviets are seen not as players in the great drama of world struggle -- but only as indigent revolutionaries of agrarian reformers.

This is the principle problem behind the handling of such matters as the Central American crisis. The Western media finds it so difficult to see the hand of the Soviet Union or a Cuba in such crises; so they miss the real story. My favorite is a headline that appeared in the Washington Post some months before the Sandinistas gained power in Nicaragua. The headline read "Sandinistas disavow Marxist ties."

II THE SOLUTION

For many years, conservative political candidates in America have faced a similarly liberal press. They have largely overcome this problem by understanding how to use a carefully developed communications strategy to attract the attention of the press; a strategy that employs the drama of new proposals, media events and rhetorical sorties to

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overcome this difficulty. The presumption upon which this success depends is the following: the media is composed of people who, whatever their political persuasions, are professionals first and will respond to a good story -- if that story is made available to them. Because of the media's unexamined prejudices this sometimes takes considerable work and a good deal of imagination. It takes carefully written statements, it takes careful and impressive research; and, above all, it takes repetition. This repetition takes the form of telephone or personal talks with members of the media (pointing out the validity and importance of certain news stories that are underreported) and statements by government or private sector individuals.

I cite here one instance from the 1980 Presidential campaign. In May of 1980, William Casey asked opposition research to look into the Carter record and explore its weaknesses. After a month and a half of the study of the Carter record, it became obvious that throughout his career the former President was given to attacking his opponents in the harshest terms possible. A communications strategy was quickly developed during the summer of 1980. It included the dissemination of a letter by Senator Paul Laxalt to editorial writers and newsmen throughout the country which outlined (with eight pages of careful documentation going back to Carter's first gubernatorial campaign) the former President's penchant for personal attacks. During a briefing on Capitol Hill for Republican members of the Congress, this Carter penchant was mentioned prominently. This caused some dismay. One Republican congressman even walked out of the briefing in anger, claiming that Carter's "nastiness" or, "meanness" would only be a "peripheral" issue in the campaign. He was quoted to this effect in a subsequent news account.

As we know, the prediction that Carter would resort to personal attacks was exactly correct. When those personal attacks began in September, much of the media had been warned -- and provided with documentation about similar occurrences in other Carter campaigns.

The minute Carter began to engage in these attacks, we responded with a series of counter thrusts from campaign headquarters -- ranging from President Ford's "Demeaning of the Presidency" attacks on Carter to telephone calls and press releases sent to certain members of the media.

This is not to detract in any way from the fact that many of those in the media had already concluded that Carter had a mean streak -- but the point is: this was a constant theme stressed by the Reagan-Bush campaign -- with documentation to back it up. And this is one reason why the "meanness" story took hold.

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In the 1980 campaign, this sort of strategy was also used in exploiting other issues such as the incumbency uses of the prior administration, decline in defense readiness, etc.

What is badly needed is a plan to develop those issues and stories that are overlooked by a media that tends to discount, at first glimpse, their importance. A "working group" is needed to meet weekly, to discuss the legitimate information that is not getting out, to examine the weaknesses of the Soviet Union and -- by using the information channels available to us -- to make those weaknesses clear to our own Country and to the world. This working group could then develop statements by Administration officials as well as studies and research developed by both the Administration and outside sources to draw attention to legitimate but otherwise overlooked stories.

What is important to remember here is that we must develop a communications strategy -- not a foreign policy, not a defense policy, not policy for VOA or USICA. All of these are factors, but the end result must be a careful coordination of the efforts of a number of agencies in the Administration and those outside the Administration who are anxious to help.

III THE SOVIETS' REAL WEAKNESS

The Soviets have always telegraphed their real weakness. They become intensely and irrationally upset by any mention of the occupation army in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, or the desire of numerous Soviet Republics such as the Ukraine for self-determination.

I am attaching an article I did for National Review some years ago which illustrates some methods by which we might exploit these weaknesses.

But Irving Kristol has said it best: merely talking about these matters can do the Soviet Empire more damage "than a dozen grain embargoes."

IV A SCENARIO

Here is an example of the sort of things that could be done within a few months period of time.

1. Ambassador to the United Nations Jean Kirkpatrick makes a major speech in the United Nations on the Russian occupation army in Eastern Europe. The speech, which is carefully researched and documented, outlines Soviet transgressions against the freedom of Eastern European

peoples since Yalt. The ambassadors asks that this matter be placed on the UN agenda.

2. The State Department begins studying the feasibility of Governments in Exile in the United States. This step is taken in response to Soviet intransigence in Poland or aggression in Central America.

3. As a further bargaining chip, the United States will study the feasibility of such Governments in Exile for the Ukraine and other non-Russian Republics.

4. A major presidential speech on Soviet American relations. The speech, while moderate in tone, emphasizes the President's themes about the decline of Soviet power and the spiritual exhaustion of the Soviet Union.

It points out the wide difference between the Soviet and the American mentality and our failure to properly understand that yawning gulf between us. The primary focus is the same as that suggested by the Marquis De Custine a century ago: "we must never blame the Russians for being what they are, only for pretending to be what we are."

5. In the speech, the appointment of a Special Commission on the Post-Communist World is announced. The NATO allies should not be left unprepared when the Soviet Empire collapses so we must begin now to plan for the world which will follow. This again stresses our confidence in the ultimate victory of Western political traditions and values -- and it robs the Soviets of the one great weapon in their propaganda arsenal: their claim to be the wave of the future.

V CONCLUSION

In the meanwhile, all sorts of variations and sub themes could be played out. Through the statements of Administration officials, through reminders to the press and especially to those columnists and writers who are receptive to the danger of the Soviet imperialism, through Government studies and broadcasts, weekly themes -- whether that of genocide against the Miskito Indians or revelations about the KGB -- could be consistently emphasized.

What we need is a working group of individuals (in the style of legislative strategy group) to do what is not very often done in Washington: to think, to reflect, to plan, to follow-up.

CAPTIVE NATIONS

Let's Take the Offensive

ANTHONY R. DOLAN

WHILE THE White House has been working to undermine the Moscow Olympics and U.S. senators have proposed everything from trade embargos to military action in response to the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan, the least risky, most effective means of retaliation—one that has in the past made the Soviets apoplectic and yet curiously diffident—is not discussed.

History notes occasional moments of such Soviet outrage and paralysis. In his recent political memoir, Richard Nixon recounts that shortly before his departure for Moscow and the kitchen debates with Khrushchev in 1959, he visited a dying Secretary of State at Walter Reed Hospital. Dulles warned him to expect a chilly reception in Moscow—because, the previous week, Congress had passed a resolution on the Captive Nations.

Khrushchev's Rage

Dulles's deathbed warning was not overstated; Nixon's reception at the Moscow airport was frigid, and Khrushchev's rage transformed a diplomatic conference between the chairman of the Politburo and the Vice President of the United States into a debate over the comparative stench of pig and horse excrement. Khrushchev finally cooled, but promised Nixon that he would hear more about the captive nations during his stay: one occasion, Nixon says, when the Soviet leader kept his word. And yet the bluster, the former President suggests, hid a wariness about American resolve. On the few subsequent occasions when Western diplomats or even publications have called into question the presence of a Soviet occupation army in Eastern Europe, the Kremlin's reaction has been equally loud, equally pained.

There is no surprise in this—totalitarians can be counted upon to know their own vulnerabilities. A few years

ago, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Daniel Patrick Moynihan, after listening to a particularly offensive lecture on American imperialism from the Yugoslavian representative, mentioned quietly the Croatian separatist movement. His sally provoked expressions of horror, then hurried calls between Belgrade and Washington. But the upshot of the diplomatic incident was a break from the anti-American stemwinders and a more subdued Yugoslavian delegation in the General Assembly.

Lawlessness breeds a curious psychology, and it is hardly necessary to look to international events for vivid examples. Students of the phenomenon of entrenched corruption in municipalities and government agencies have long remarked on the astonishing arrogance of mob figures and corrupt officials who—though aware they are under intense scrutiny—continue business as usual. It is only with the indictments and the glare of publicity that this coolness is replaced by hurt, hostile words to reporters, wild swings at photographers. At this point the self-insulation breaks apart and the outlaw sees, almost as if for the first time, himself.

The Kremlin's leaders—aged, comfortable, vastly powerful, surrounded by sycophants—can also not be expected to understand the world as it is, unless they are reminded, stinging, of their own soft underbelly: the hostility of those they have conquered and the injustice of that domination.

Herewith, then, some foreign-policy initiatives designed to exploit Soviet weakness:

► The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations should place on the agenda of the General Assembly a demand for the removal of the Soviet occupation army in Eastern Europe as well as in Afghanistan. The ambassador should follow with a lengthy historical account of Soviet subversion and aggression in Eastern Europe, carefully reconstructing—

from the end—the destruction of the national integrity of the Captive Nations, the draining of their natural resources, the deportation of dissidents, the crushed revolts, the assassinations, the massacres.

► The White House should follow with an announcement of a new form of "linkage"—henceforth diplomatic discussions of not only the Afghanistan situation but the range of diplomatic matters from fishing rights to arms reduction will include, at the very least, a ritualistic mention of the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe and demands for a troop-withdrawal timetable.

► With each well-anticipated outburst of invective and hysteria on the part of TASS or *Pravda*, American demands should escalate. The Soviet Union must remove its troops and permit free elections to be held not only in the countries of Central Europe but also in the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and, should the rantings continue, the inner republics of the Ukraine, Georgia, and the Moslem areas, which so deeply resent domination by Moscow.

On the Defensive

Such a strategy would be provocative, but, for the Soviets, disarmingly, debilitatingly so. It is calculated to cause not more aggression but rather second thoughts and retrenchment. Not only will it force the Kremlin into a defensive psychology, it will put the geopolitical frame of reference back on center and focus UN debates not on absurd discussions of colonialism in the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico but on the critical issue of the latter half of the twentieth century: Soviet imperial ambitions.

Most important, such a strategy will improve the morale and stability of the West. After the self-deception that led to the spirits of Geneva, Camp David, and Glassboro, to detente and SALT II, to presidential speeches about our "inordinate fear of Communism," we will for a change be telling the truth: about the world, about its awful danger, about our resolve to change it. □

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